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IntroductIon A central issue in judicial review of administrative agency action is the determination of what materials a reviewing court is allowed to consider. Can the court consider evidence that the agency 1 did not consider? Can it consider reasons for the agency action that the agency did not assert when it took the action in question? Can it consider arguments that the private party failed to make during administrative consideration of the matter?
We can imagine a spectrum between completely closed and completely open judicial review. At the closed end of the spectrum, the court would consider no evidence that the agency had not considered ("closed record"), no reasons that the agency failed to assert when it made the decision ("closed reasons"), and no arguments except those made during agency consideration of the matter ("closed arguments"). At the open end of the spectrum, the court would ignore everything that had occurred at the agency level; all of the evidence and argument would be new and the court would be indifferent to the reasons the agency gave for its decision.
This paper considers the U.S. and Israeli practice on this issue. The United States falls close to the closed end of the spectrum. The United States is an outlier; it may have the most closed system of judicial review of any country in the world. Most other countries use open review, either in courts of general jurisdiction or in specialized administrative courts (although some countries close review of tribunal decisions). Israel originally followed the British model of closed review as practiced in the United Kingdom around 1950, but changed its practice and now falls closer to the open end of the spectrum. We seek to explain why these countries have followed different paths and speculate about the relationship between openness of the judicial review process and other doctrines of judicial review. 2 By focusing on the conflicting review practices of the United States and Israel, we hope to shed light on a fundamental but understudied problem of administrative law. We believe that the issue of whether judicial review should be open or closed is not merely a technical or procedural question. Rather, it reflects important policy choices and is closely related to central administrative law doctrines. The choice between open and closed review fundamentally affects the balance of power between administrative agencies and reviewing courts.
1. We use the term "agency" in the sense that it is used in U.S. law, meaning a governmental unit (other than a court or a legislature) having delegated power to implement government policy. The term includes governmental units with various titles used throughout the world, such as ministries and departments. It also includes both units situated within the executive branch of government and those that are independent of the executive branch. This Article considers U.S. federal administrative law, not state or local practice. 
I. u.s. PractIce: cLosed JudIcIaL revIew
In general, the United States practices closed judicial review regardless of the type of agency action that is subject to review. In other words, it does not matter whether the action in question is formal or informal adjudication, rulemaking, or a government policyimplementation decision that is neither adjudication nor rulemaking. However, because U.S. courts recognize a number of exceptions to closed review practice, the United States falls near the closed end of the open/closed spectrum but does not quite reach it.
In understanding the U.S. practice, it is helpful to consider the type of agency action that is subject to judicial review.
A. Formal and Informal Adjudication
We define adjudication as agency action of specific applicability. 3 The norm in U.S. administrative adjudicatory practice is formal adjudication, meaning that the agency conducts an evidentiary hearing to resolve a dispute between the government and a private party (or occasionally between two private parties). Evidentiary hearings (which usually resemble adversarial judicial trials) are often required by the due process clause of the federal constitution 4 as well as by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 by statutes applicable to particular administrative schemes, or by procedural regulations. However, formal adjudication by no means fills the administrative adjudicatory space. There are many schemes of adjudication with respect to which no provision of the Constitution or of a statute, executive order, or procedural regulation requires an evidentiary hearing or, indeed, any procedure at all. We refer to these cases as informal adjudication.
The term "formal adjudication" is often used to describe the types of hearings described by the APA. The initial decisionmaker in APA formal adjudication is an agency official called an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who works for the agency in question but has substantial de jure and de facto decisional independence. However, we use the 3. This definition is not the same as that provided by the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, which does not properly distinguish between adjudication and rulemaking. Sometimes the term "quasi-judicial" is used to describe adjudicatory action. In many countries, agency adjudicatory decisions are referred to as "administrative acts." Israeli practice distinguishes between quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and administrative action. See infra Part II.A.
4. U.S. const. arts. V (relating to the federal government), XIV (relating to state or local government).
5. 5 U.S.C. § § 551, 554, 556-557.
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term "formal adjudication" more broadly to include evidentiary hearings required by due process or by statutes other than the APA, or by other sources of law such as executive orders or procedural regulations. For example, disputes about deportation are resolved by formal trialtype hearings required by specific statutes (and in many situations by due process); however, the federal APA is inapplicable to immigration cases, 6 meaning that the initial decisionmaker is not an ALJ. In formal adjudication, the decisionmaker must be impartial and cannot have any adversarial involvement in the case (such as having served as an investigator or advocate on the agency's behalf). The decisionmaker cannot consider any evidentiary inputs except those introduced at the hearing (the "exclusive record" rule). U.S. judicial practice calls for closed review of agency adjudicatory decisions in both formal and informal adjudication. As we will observe, however, 7 the case for closed review is much stronger for formal than for informal adjudication.
Closed Record
The closed record is deeply rooted in U.S. legal culture. In ordinary litigation, an appellate court is confined to the record made before the trial court. 8 Because of separation of powers, the closed record approach seems even more natural in the world of administrative adjudication, 9 since the court is reviewing action taken by a coordinate branch of government rather than by a lower court. Indeed, the APA judicial review provision (applicable to review of all types of agency action) requires that a court "shall review the whole record," which at least implies a closed record.
10
The closed record requirement reflects important efficiency concerns. In the case of formal adjudication, the hearing has already generated an organized and complete record for judicial review, consisting of the transcript of testimony and argument and documents submitted into evidence. It would be costly and cause significant delays for the reviewing court to make a new record by taking evidence that the agency had not considered.
11 Moreover, judicial review 10. 5 U.S.C. § 706 in fine. The final clause of the provision reads in whole: "In making the foregoing determinations [regarding the legality of the administrative action], the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." Id. (emphasis added). The "whole record" language in the APA means that a court must consider the evidence in the record that detracts from the agency's conclusion as well as the evidence that justifies it. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951 
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of formal adjudication often takes place at the appellate-court rather than the trial-court level; appellate courts are not equipped (and not accustomed) to conduct trials.
In addition, U.S. judicial review is constrained by deference doctrines that would be undermined if a reviewing court could consider new evidence. Judicial review of agency fact finding is limited by the "substantial evidence" test, meaning that the reviewing court must sustain "reasonable" findings of fact by the agency even if the court disagrees with them.
12 If the reviewing court could consider new evidence, the court would become the fact finder and the "substantial evidence" test would be negated. Moreover, if the court could consider new evidence, the private party would have a perverse incentive to hold back its best evidence until the judicial review phase, in order to deny the agency a chance to consider (and perhaps discredit) it. In U.S. parlance, this practice is referred to as "sandbagging."
Closed Reasons
In U.S. administrative law, agencies must state the reasons for their actions in order for reviewing courts to evaluate the rationality of those actions. 13 The reasons must be stated contemporaneously with the agency decision, not advanced for the first time at the judicial review stage. The source of the "closed reasons" rule in the United States is the first Chenery case.
14 The two Chenery cases involved decisions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring officers of a utility company to relinquish a large profit earned by acquiring preferred stock while administering the company's reorganization, then converting it to common stock. The rationale for the SEC's decision in Chenery I was that the insiders violated equitable fiduciary duty doctrines. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that equity rules did not support the SEC's decision. The SEC argued that its decision could be justified by a different reason, namely its experience in administering public utility reorganizations. However, the Supreme Court refused to consider this reason because it was a "post hoc" rationalization offered for the first time on judicial review. [Vol. 64
The closed reasons rule is justified by considerations derived from the separation of powers. 16 The SEC is responsible for administering the securities law and it must make the initial decision about whether that law justified the sanction it imposed.
17 Consideration by the courts of post-hoc rationalizations for agency decisions would be inconsistent with the SEC's statutory responsibility and would make the court, rather than the agency, the instrument of policy articulation.
The Chenery rule also makes good pragmatic sense. It promotes rigorous reasoning by agency staff professionals and agency heads, because it induces them to settle on a rationale as part of the decisionmaking process. It helps to ensure that the reasons will be supported by the written record. It means that the agency's reasons are determined by the agency's professionals (such as scientists and experienced staffers) and by politically responsible agency heads, rather than by government lawyers on judicial review. 18 Moreover, a policy of requiring agency decisionmakers to furnish contemporaneous explanations enables parties to decide whether they have grounds for an appeal.
19
In addition, the Chenery rule is justified by considerations relating to agency accountability. It forces agency heads to articulate their positions in overt ways that facilitate political oversight of those positions. Otherwise, the agency could avoid disclosure of its reasoning (and thus forestall a political backlash) if no party sought review or the case was settled rather than decided by an appellate court. In all of these ways, Chenery contributes to the integrity of discretionary decision making.
Closed Arguments
The "closed arguments" rule (also known as "issue exhaustion") requires a private party to raise at the agency level every argument that the party wishes to raise at the judicial review level. 20 (1946) . In Aragon, the Court said: "A reviewing court usurps the agency function when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the Commission of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action." Id. The closed argument rule originated in the context of formal adjudication but is now applied to the review of all forms of agency action.
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argument not made at the agency level is considered to have been waived. Again, this rule serves interests arising out of separation of powers, deference, and efficiency. The agency should have an opportunity to remedy a procedural defect or to apply its expertise to a policy objection before a court considers those issues. Moreover, the Chevron doctrine requires a court to uphold any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 21 If the court could entertain arguments about statutory interpretation that the agency never considered, Chevron would be undermined.
Closed Review of Informal Adjudication
The same closed review rules apply to judicial review of decisions reached by informal adjudication. 22 However, the circumstances of formal and informal adjudication are quite different. In informal adjudication, an agency may never have conducted an evidentiary hearing (or any kind of hearing) and is not limited by the exclusive record requirement. Often, the agency makes its decision by considering economic or environmental studies and informally consulting the parties. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that judicial review of informal adjudication decisions must be on the basis of a closed record, consisting of all materials considered by responsible agency staff members. 23 These materials may consist of a large number of documents contained in many paper or electronic files. Assembling such a "record" poses serious practical difficulties. In addition, the closed reasons rule applies, even though the agency might not have been legally required to state reasons, and the closed arguments rule applies even though there was never an organized procedure by which the private parties could make arguments. Because of the differences between formal and informal adjudication, the case for closed review of decisions reached by informal adjudication is tenuous. [Vol. 64
B. Rulemaking
"Rulemaking" is the process for adoption of "rules," meaning agency action of general applicability. 25 The APA prescribes public notice and opportunity for comment before a rule is adopted. 26 As developed by post-1946 case law and practice, the "notice and comment" system generates a "record" consisting of the documents prepared by the agency staff in formulating the rule, public comments, transcripts of public meetings, material such as scientific studies that the agency considers, required agency analyses (such as environmental impact statements), and a thorough statement of reasons. The statement of reasons must explain why the agency disagreed with material public comments.
Judicial review of rules is closed, meaning that at the judicial review stage, neither side 27 can introduce new evidence, the private party cannot make arguments that were never raised by anyone during the comment period, 28 and the agency cannot bring forth new reasons. 29 The closure doctrines fit well with the APA rulemaking procedure, because the process generates a complete and organized record and a complete reasons statement. As in the case of adjudication, the rationale for closed record review of rules arises out of concern with efficiency, separation of powers, and deference to agency expertise. In addition, judicial review of rules usually occurs in appellate courts before the rule is ever enforced; as a result, no evidence about how the rule operates in practice is available. 30 The parties who seek pre-enforcement review are typically the same ones 25 . In American practice, the terms "rule" and "regulation" mean the same thing, and the words are used interchangeably in this article. This definition is not the same as that provided in the federal APA, which fails to adequately distinguish rulemaking from adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 553. The APA also provides for "formal rulemaking," which involves a trial-type process, but this procedure is virtually never used. An enormous body of law implements the APA's deceptively simple informal rulemaking provisions. See generally JeffreY s. Lubbers, a GuIde to federaL aGencY ruLeMakInG (5th ed. 2012).
27. It is unclear whether the agency can include material in the rulemaking record that was considered by the agency heads but was added after the close of the comment period, so that outsiders never had an opportunity to challenge it. 
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that were involved in the rulemaking process, so they have no new evidence or arguments to offer at the judicial review stage (unless they have strategically held them back by "sandbagging," which obviously should be discouraged).
However, there are practical and theoretical arguments against closed record judicial review of rules that do not arise in connection with formal adjudication. The rulemaking record includes all materials "considered" by the agency staff and agency head during the rulemaking process, whether these materials are helpful to the agency or to opponents of the rule. There may be an immense amount of such material. Moreover, there are numerous conceptual and practical problems of deciding what should be included and excluded from the rulemaking record.
31
The agency must anticipate that its rule will be challenged in court, so it must contemporaneously assemble and organize all this material in preparation for judicial review. Because of the closed reasons requirement, an agency's statement of reasons for the rule must anticipate every possible objection that challengers to the rule might raise. The closed argument rule requires challengers to raise every conceivable argument against the rule (without knowing what form the final rule will take), forcing them to submit voluminous comments. 38 (1975) . ACUS recently adopted a recommendation concerning the record for judicial review of rules. Under ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking, available at https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/ administrative-record-informal-rulemaking, all materials "considered" by the agency should be included in the administrative record that is certified to the reviewing court. According to the recommendation, the term "considered" means that the document was reviewed "by an individual with substantive responsibilities in connection with the rulemaking," even if the reviewer disagreed with the document (unless the individual determined that it was not germane to the subject matter of the rulemaking). Since an agency normally has a proposed rule under consideration for a lengthy period before it is proposed for public comment and for a lengthy period after the comment period closes, and since numerous staffers have "substantive responsibilities in connection with the rulemaking," a potentially enormous number of documents must be certified to the reviewing court. Even so, it is unclear whether certain kinds of documents must be included. [Vol. 64 call "rulemaking ossification."
32 And the agency must do all of this for every rule it adopts (whether or not through notice-and-comment), even though many rules are never reviewed at all.
Although many rules are reviewed before they go into effect, others are not reviewed until they are enforced or otherwise applied. This may occur years or decades after the rule is adopted. While the case law allows the enforcement target to challenge the legality of the rule, even if statutory time limits on challenges to the rule have expired, 33 the closed review requirements apply to such challenges. The challenger is allowed to introduce new evidence to establish that the rule does not apply to the challenger or that the challenger did not violate the rule. However, the challenger is not permitted to bring forth new evidence or arguments that the rule is contrary to the governing statute or unreasonable. 34 Application of closed review doctrines in this situation gives rise to serious concerns that do not arise in connection with pre-enforcement review. Often, persons against whom the rule is enforced did not know about or chose not to participate in the notice-and-comment process, or never imagined that the rule could be applied to them.
C. Judicial Review of Policy Implementation
The universe of policy-implementation decisions is enormous. In RSR, a statute permitted a challenge to the rule within ninety days after it was adopted and precluded challenges thereafter. RSR challenged the rule three years after adoption, when the rule was applied to it. RSR was barred from introducing evidence of a new scientific study that it claimed would undermine the rule. However, it was allowed to introduce evidence challenging the agency's determination that the rule applied to it. 
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design competitions, making decisions involving multiple uses of public lands, siting airports or power plants, protecting endangered species habitats, and countless other examples. These types of governmental decision making involve a mix of fact finding, legal interpretation, law application, policy making, and policy application, mixed up with concerns about political repercussions, public relations, federalism, budget constraints, and public administration. The APA suggests that agency action is either rulemaking or adjudication. But this dichotomous approach works poorly when it comes to policy implementation. Policyimplementation decisions are neither adjudication (since they are not directed at specific private parties) nor rulemaking (since they do not establish general rules), as this Article has defined those terms.
38 Most policy implementation is not judicially reviewable, but some of it is.
Judicial review of policy-implementation decisions involves different considerations than review of adjudication or rulemaking. The case for closed record review of such decisions is uneasy 39 because the decision-making process does not generate a structured evidentiary record and assembling it is a laborious and deeply problematic process. The record should contain all of the materials that responsible staff members considered in making the decision. As a result, agency staff must scrutinize vast quantities of disorganized and widely dispersed files. Similarly, the process may not give rise to a thoughtful agency statement of reasons and may not furnish an opportunity for the private parties to make arguments.
The key decision about judicial review of policy implementation is Overton Park. 40 The federal Department of Transportation (DOT) decided to provide funds to construct an interstate highway through a park in Memphis, even though a statute prohibited building roads through a park unless there was no "feasible and prudent" alternative route. 41 The agency did not explain how its decision to route the road through the park was consistent with the statute. The process of planning the highway route consumed many years, involved a costly and contentious decision-making process, and was based on a [Vol. 64 complex mix of planning, political, and economic considerations, as well as park protection. Although there were numerous public hearings about the highway route, there was no organized process by which the agency constructed a record suitable for judicial review of the decision. Indeed, it was unclear whether the Department's heavily political decision was reviewable at all.
The Supreme Court held that the decision to route the highway through the park was reviewable; the statutory "feasible and prudent" provision provided a legal standard by which the agency decision could be reviewed. 42 The Court held that DOT's discretionary decision on routing the highway should be reviewed under the APA's standard of "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" 43 (hereinafter referred to as the "arbitrary and capricious" test). Although such review should be deferential, the court should engage in "thorough, probing, in-depth review." 44 This language gave birth to the now well-recognized federal practice of "hard-look" review of discretionary action. 45 The Supreme Court ruled that review of the highway routing decision was closed, and that review should be based on the record before the agency, rather than on a new record constructed at the judicial review stage. 46 This holding is questionable, because the APA explicitly recognizes the possibility of de novo judicial review when the agency decision resulted from a process that did not generate an exclusive record. 47 The Supreme Court distorted the legislative history of this provision and gave it a narrow construction that made it inapplicable to the Overton Park situation. 48 42. Because the statute provided a legal standard, the judicial review exception for action "committed to agency discretion" in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), was inapplicable.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A 46. "That review is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made the decision." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
47. "A reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(F).
48. At the time the APA was adopted, the general understanding was that courts would provide de novo review of any agency action that was not required by statute to be based on an exclusive record. The APA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended that this practice would continue. The House Committee wrote:
In short, where a rule or order is not required by statute to be made after opportunity for agency hearing and to be reviewed solely upon the record thereof, the facts pertinent to any relevant question of law must be tried and determined de novo by the reviewing court respecting either the validity or application of such rule or order-because facts necessary to the determina-
According to Overton Park, DOT was not legally required to state the reasons for its choice of route. However, if it failed to provide a reasons statement, the reviewing court should determine those unstated reasons. If necessary, the court should require the officials who made the decision to testify concerning their reasoning process, but they could not come up with new reasons for their actions. 49 Thus Overton Park established that the closed reasons requirement of Chenery applied to policy-implementation decisions, even though no statute or other source of law required the agency to state its reasons for taking action. The consequence of this decision was a lengthy trial that attempted to reconstruct what DOT officials knew or should have known. 50 The judge determined that the Secretary of Transportation had not seriously addressed the availability of a feasible and prudent alternative, so the matter was remanded to the Secretary for a new decision.
51
Later cases overruled this aspect of the Overton Park decision. An inadequately explained discretionary decision is not to be reviewed through a trial that ascertains the reasons for the agency action. Instead, the reviewing court is limited to the materials considered by the decisionmaker (a closed record). If the decision cannot be reviewed on the basis of this record or the contemporaneous reasons given by the agency, the case must be remanded to the agency to reconsider the case and supply a new reasons statement.
52

D. Exceptions to Closed Review
In general, the Unites States practices closed judicial review of all forms of agency action. Nevertheless, reviewing courts recognize a number of rather nebulous exceptions to the various closed review doctrines. In general, these exceptions (many of them questioned in academic writing and tion of any relevant question of law must be determined on record somewhere and if Congress has not provided that an agency shall do so, then the record must be made in court. h.r. reP. no. 79-1980, at 45-46 (1946 [Vol. 64 in the case law) apply only to "unusual circumstances justifying a departure from this general rule."
53 Because most cases do not present "unusual circumstances," reviewing courts reject most attempts to introduce new evidence, new reasons, or new arguments at the judicial review stage.
Closed Record Requirement
Because new evidence is usually offered for the purpose of impeaching the agency decision, reviewing courts typically reject it.
54 Nevertheless, various more or less problematic exceptions to the closed record rule have emerged.
a. Completion of the Record
Some cases involve attempts to complete the record because the challenger claims that the agency failed to include materials that should have been included. These might be documents that some member of the agency staff had considered during the decision-making process and that support the challenger's argument that the decision is arbitrary and capricious. Or the agency may have excluded from the record documents offered by a party that should have been considered. If the challenger establishes a prima facie case that the record is incomplete, it may be allowed to engage in discovery proceedings to determine what additional materials should be included. 
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exception arises most frequently in the review of adjudicatory disputes. For example, a closed record would fail to disclose newly discovered evidence revealing that the decisionmaker was biased, received improper ex parte communications from outsiders or from adversarial staff members, or was subjected to political pressure.
c. National Environmental Policy Act Cases
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 57 is a federal statute that requires an agency to consider environmental effects in its decision making. If a project might have a major effect on the environment, the agency must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS). Some cases suggest that an open record is appropriate in NEPA cases where the issue is the adequacy of the environmental impact statement (EIS). 58 The purpose of the EIS is to inform the public and the agency of all of the major environmental effects of a particular decision. On review, a challenger might assert that the agency failed in its investigative function by not taking account of certain negative environmental impacts, even though these impacts had not been raised by public comments in the record or discussed by the agency. According to some cases, a reviewing court must be allowed to resort to non-record evidence to determine "whether an EIS has neglected to mention a serious environmental consequence, or otherwise swept stubborn problems or serious criticism under the rug." 59 Other cases disagree with this analysis and enforce a closed record in all NEPA cases. 60 Other NEPA cases have employed open records to show that an agency has committed itself to a project before preparing its EIS (so-called "predetermination" 65. See Murphy, supra note 16, at 858-74 (arguing that courts often ignore the closed reasons rule when it is convenient to do so). A court can also deploy a harmless error analysis when it wishes to avoid the rule against consideration of new reasons. In addition, the common practice of remanding without vacating the agency decision has the effect of negating the closed reasons requirement. Remand without vacation allows the agency action to go into effect while the agency corrects the Chenery problem by stating acceptable reasons.
66. Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the agency's explanation; since the original decision was unexplained, any explanation would be a new rationalization); Black & Hallmark, supra note 24, at 234-43 (noting that agencies are permitted to supplement the record with explanations contained in affidavits and by materials prepared during bid protests to the Government Accountability Office).
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others refuse to apply Chenery when it seems nonsensical to do so. 67 
Closed Arguments
The courts apply the closed argument rule in a somewhat flexible manner.
68 This is unsurprising, given that the closed argument rule (often described as "issue exhaustion") is a branch of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, a set of rules that is subject to numerous exceptions. 69 Thus, the Supreme Court allowed a Social Security applicant to raise issues on appeal that he had not raised in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain review of an ALJ decision from the Social Security Appeals Council. 70 The Court recognized that parties seeking disability benefits are often unrepresented by lawyers and may be quite unsophisticated; moreover, the proceedings are inquisitorial in nature and the Appeal Council has primary responsibility for identifying the issues. practice of open review influences many aspects of administrative law and interrelates with major judicial review issues.
II. IsraeLI PractIce: oPen JudIcIaL revIew
Unlike the United States, Israel has yet to adopt a comprehensive statute that regulates administrative procedures. 72 The principles governing administrative procedure are largely the product of case law developed by the High Court of Justice (HCJ). The HCJ is the Israeli Supreme Court sitting in its capacity as the superior administrative court. Judicial review in Israel is carried out either by the HCJ, which functions as a court of first and last instance in many of the most important administrative cases, or by the administrative courts (which are district courts sitting in administrative cases and hear the bulk of the less important administrative cases). In the latter situation, the decisions of the administrative courts are subject to appeal before the HCJ.
73
A. Types of Administrative Procedure
Israeli administrative law does not contain mandatory procedures for "rulemaking" and "adjudication." Instead, and following in the footsteps of U.K. administrative law, the case law distinguishes quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative actions. 73. When a civil or criminal dispute arises in Israel, it normally makes its way to a county court. County court decisions are appealed to the district court. Only a handful of such cases reach the Supreme Court, which considers only questions of law raised by the case, a function referred to as "cassation." The Supreme Court also sits as an appellate court for cases involving certain serious criminal offenses or significant civil disputes. Such cases are tried by the district court and then heard on appeal by the Supreme Court. This procedure also applies to decisions of administrative tribunals. See Administrative Affairs Courts Law, 5760-2000, SH No. 1739 p. 190. Prior to 2000, all cases involving public agencies exercising their legal powers (other than decisions of tribunals) were brought directly before the Supreme Court (sitting as the HCJ) and resolved by the HCJ with no further appeal. A law passed in 2000 routed less important administrative cases to the district courts (referred to as administrative courts for purposes of this function). See id. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Israel serves three different functions: as a court of cassation, a court of appeal, and a court of first (and last) instance for the more important administrative law judicial review cases. The Supreme Court has fifteen judges, who normally sit in panels of three (except in unusually important cases, where the panel is composed of a larger, uneven number of judges).
74. There is a third category, known as "administrative action," to which the principles of natural justice (i.e., fair hearing and the requirement of neutrality) do not apply. However, the definition of "administrative action" is relatively narrow and the definition of "quasi-judicial" is wide. Quasi-judicial action includes almost any administrative action that may prejudice a private interest. 
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regulates the formation of regulations, except for the minimal requirement for publication in the official register. 75 However, many specific statutes contain additional requirements of consultation or approval by a Knesset (parliamentary) committee. 76 In addition, under guidelines adopted by the Attorney General, government authorities that adopt regulations must coordinate policies with other governmental units and consult experts and interested groups. 77 Israeli law does not include notice-and-comment procedures and excludes quasi-legislative procedures from the requirements of natural justice.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has imposed some important procedural requirements on agencies engaged in quasi-legislative decision making. For example, it ruled that agencies must provide reasons for policy decisions in some cases. 78 In addition, the HCJ has established that agencies that create policies must conduct a rational process of decision making. The requirements include systematic data collection, data processing, consultation with experts, review of professional reports, formation of general policies, assessments of alternatives, and (in some cases) generation of reasoned decisions. 79 These decisions do not amount to requiring agencies to create a record; as a result, discussion of the "record" in the context of judicial review of quasi-legislative actions is virtually nonexistent.
Quasi-judicial actions include individualized decisions such as licensing and state benefits. Such decisions are subject to the requirements of natural justice, meaning a neutral decisionmaker and a hearing at which the private party has an opportunity to tell its side of the story. Agencies are required to provide reasons for quasi-judicial decisions. 80 However, natural justice does not require agencies to utilize adversarial procedures. 
B. The Three Stages of Adjudicatory Proceedings
There are typically three procedural stages for adjudicative proceedings. 82 The first is the initial administrative decision. In Israel, the initial decision is usually investigatory in nature and can be written by the investigator. Such proceedings are subject to the principles of natural justice. The decisionmaker is required to give reasons. 83 The second (or "reconsideration") stage is often an appeal to an administrative tribunal which conducts a de novo merits review of the initial decision. Israel has no unified system of administrative tribunals like those in the United Kingdom or Australia. 84 The statute that regulates a specific field may provide for an appeal to a tribunal and define the powers and procedures of the tribunal. The Administrative Tribunals Law of 1992 provides the procedural framework for administrative tribunals and ensures their independence vis-à-vis the agencies, 85 but it only applies to those tribunals that are specified in the addendum to the statute. Therefore, most administrative tribunals are not subject to its general requirements, and are governed exclusively by the provisions of the specific statute at issue. 86 The Administrative Tribunals Law itself refers to the administrative record of agencies only indirectly in the context of the right of the appellant to have access to "documents in the possession of the authority relating to the decision," and does not confine the parties or the tribunal to such documents.
87
The third stage (or the second stage if there is no tribunal or other form of administrative reconsideration) is judicial review conducted by either the administrative court or the HCJ. 88 At this stage the reviewing court holds the power to grant any remedy should it find the decision illegal. The judicial review stage is governed by the principle of deference to the original decision of the agency, meaning that the court should not replace the administrative policies with its own policy preferences. The court should interfere only on the basis of some illegality such as ultra vires, illegal purposes, or unreasonableness. Correspondingly, the court is not supposed to second-guess the 
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process of fact finding by the agency unless the administrative decision was not based upon "reasonable" evidence. 89 As we discuss later, however, Israeli courts apply the reasonableness test more broadly than in the United Kingdom, the United States, and many other countries.
90
C. Closed and Open Judicial Review in Israel
The Record on Judicial Review
During the first two decades after Establishment, Israeli administrative law followed in the footsteps of English law with respect to the administrative record. Under English law, courts could overturn administrative decisions only if the action was ultra vires (which was the main ground for judicial review) or if there was an error on the face of the record (i.e., in the text of the decision). 91 Consequently, English courts had no need to consider issues relating to the administrative record, meaning the evidence presented to the agency. 92 Early decisions by the HCJ demonstrated loyalty to English doctrine, although even at that period the meaning of the term "record" (for purposes of applying the rule that courts could consider only errors appearing "on the face of the record") remained rather vague. 93 During the 1960s, however, the HCJ openly diverged from the English rule that confined the reviewing court to consideration of the terms of the decision rather than to the record of what occurred before the agency. 94 In the leading case of Trudler v. Election Officer, 95 the respondents argued that the petitioners' attack on the Officer's decision was not directed to an error on the face of the record and that the court was precluded from discussing any evidence or arguments not on the record. Justice Berenzon pointed to the fact that [Vol. 64 even the House of Lords of England at the time showed a tendency to expand this narrow approach, and then said the following:
I can see no reason why the court would not be able to see all the materials that were presented before the administrative agency . . . and under the special circumstances of the current case, it seems to me that we should take a step forward and admit all the evidence brought by the petitioners which were not presented before the Officer. The petitioners were not party to the original proceedings and therefore cannot be limited to the evidence that the original parties brought or did not bring [before the Officer]. This court should deal with the issue at stake on the basis of all the pertinent evidence, including those materials presented by petitioners.
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In Trudler, the Court opened the gate for the reviewing court to consider new evidence offered by third parties who were not parties to the original proceedings. 97 However, this decision had a much broader effect, because it was interpreted to permit a reviewing court to consider new evidence presented by parties who did participate in the original proceeding. 98 Nevertheless, the exact scope of the Trudler doctrine is far from clear; the case law remains eclectic and devoid of systematic development. The following sections consider in greater detail the various implications of opening review to factual evidence, arguments, and reasons not considered by the agency.
Open Record
Under Israeli administrative law, agencies are required to gather data, establish the facts, and base their conclusions upon "reasonable" evidence. 99 In the absence of formal proceedings at the initial decision level, in many cases the first stage at which a "record" is created is at the stages of appeal to a tribunal or judicial review. Accordingly, to the extent that the HCJ in judicial review refers to constraints related to the "record," it is difficult to distinguish between references to the administrative record created at the initial decision level by the agency and to the record established by the judicial echelons below the HCJ (i.e., the tribunal or the administrative court). 
2016]
In any event, the law regarding the possibility of introducing new evidence at the judicial review stage remains unclear. The general practice of both the HCJ and the administrative courts is to reject new evidence, since admitting such evidence would undermine the required deference to the factual conclusions of the authorized agency. 101 For that reason, courts often reject attempts by the parties to present new evidence at the judicial review stage. 102 However, the enforcement of this norm is inconsistent. In some cases, courts open the door to new evidence, 103 particularly in cases of petitions that involve issues of fundamental human rights and in immigration cases. 104 There seems to be no distinction in this respect between cases in which the administrative "record" was established during the initial administrative decision and cases in which there was an appeal to an administrative tribunal prior to the judicial review stage. 105 Some fundamental doctrines relating to judicial review support the general rule against the presentation of new evidence. First, judicial review is based on affidavits prepared by the parties. Oral testimony and cross-examination require special permission by the reviewing court, which is rarely given.
106 Logically, this restriction [Vol. 64
to affidavits would not preclude the parties from using affidavits to introduce new evidence at the judicial review stage. However, the historical development of the affidavit rule before the administrative courts suggests that the default rule for Israeli judicial review is a closed record. As mentioned above, until 2000 the HCJ served as the exclusive court for judicial review of all administrative cases. The HCJ was overwhelmed with administrative cases and was too busy to hear oral testimony. 107 In 2000, the Knesset passed a law that moved most administrative petitions to the administrative courts (in which a single judge of the district court performs the task of judicial review).
108 Although the new statute also limited evidence to affidavits, it enabled the administrative judge to grant permission for oral testimony and cross-examination. 109 Since, unlike the HCJ, the administrative courts were not expected to suffer from the problem of overwhelming caseloads, some commentators argued that these courts should be more willing to accept oral evidence rather than affidavits. The HCJ, however, was quick to negate this assumption. In Sorchi v. Interior Office, the Court explained:
By accepting the new statute, the legislature aimed "to keep the substantive and procedural distinctiveness of administrative law as developed by the High Court of Justice" . . . Indeed, in some cases the administrative court may be called upon to provide an independent evaluation of the facts . . . but in this case petitioners did not establish a cause to diverge from the general rule under which, in administrative proceedings, the court does not hear testimony or establish facts . . . . Even if petitioners seek to bring new testimony, the place to do this is before the respondent [agency], not before the administrative court.
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The Sorchi decision demonstrates that while Israeli courts do not espouse a clear and consistent doctrine of closed record, they are not willing to adopt a general rule of open record either.
Another rule that connects well to this (partly) closed record approach is the rule regarding deference to the agency's factual conclusions, particularly with respect to the agency's resolution 2016] of conflicting expert opinions. In civil litigation, the general rule is that each party presents expert testimony and opinion and the court decides which expert opinion to prefer. In judicial review of agency action, however, the court is not expected to delve into the disagreements among experts. Instead, it should respect any factual conclusion by the agency based on expert opinion, unless such expert opinion is fundamentally flawed or flatly unreasonable. 111 This rule of deference towards an agency's factual findings and its resolution of conflicting expert opinions corroborates the basic concept that the factual basis for the administrative decision is to be established at the agency level-not in the courtroom.
New Arguments at the Judicial Review Stage
There is no clear-cut rule in Israeli law that limits the parties to the legal and policy arguments they raised before the administrative agency or before a tribunal. Nevertheless, the path for raising new arguments is not wide open. Rather, courts often denounce attempts by the parties to raise arguments not raised before the agency as a forbidden "change of front." 112 In such cases, the courts may dismiss the new arguments without considering them on the merits, or give a short and reluctant look into the merits before dismissing them. 113 Here, again, the doctrine does not seem to differentiate between arguments not raised before the agency at the initial decision stage, those not raised before a lower court or tribunal, and those that both parties failed to raise in their original affidavits at the judicial review stage. quasi-judicial decisions, the case law has expanded the duty to give reasons to some quasi-legislative and policy decisions. 116 The obligation to provide reasons requires an agency to state the factual basis for the decision as well as the legal and policy grounds on which it is based. 117 This comprehensive duty to state the reasons for the decision at the agency level would seem to preclude an agency from stating new reasons for its actions at the judicial review stage. However, the HCJ's decisions on this point are less decisive and more flexible than their American counterparts. 118 In the leading case of Hilron v. Fruit Council, 119 the HCJ responded to the argument that the agency is prohibited from providing reasons in court that are different from those provided in its original statement as follows:
It is certainly inconceivable that when the agency's original reasons were wrongful and it chooses to drop them in court, the court would be compelled to decide for the petitioner, even when other reasons are revealed which preclude a decision in his favor, such as reasons based on express statutory language. If it is revealed that the agency advances new reasons in order to support a decision that was erroneous as given, the court may get the impression that the new reasons are disingenuous and aimed to serve as a lip service to justify a baseless decision. And if the new reason requires additional factual findings, the court may remand the decision to the agency in order to conduct such factual investigation . . . but, despite the judicial suspicion which such post-hoc reasons receive in court . . . we found no support for the view that the court should disregard them just because they were raised [only in court]. 120 Under the rule in Hilron, agencies are allowed to raise post-hoc rationalizations for their actions even if they differ from those provided in their original statement of reasons (or if the agency failed to provide reasons at all). 121 Sometimes, the judicial suspicion towards post-hoc 2016]
rationalizations causes the court to ignore those reasons or remand the case back to the agency. 122 In most cases, however, courts consider such reasons, despite expressing their discontent with post-hoc rationalizations, and usually do not quash the decision or even remand the case. 123 
D. Open Judicial Review and General Israeli Doctrines of Judicial Review
The flexible attitude of the Israeli courts towards allowing new evidence, new arguments, and new reasons at the judicial review stage is tied to central doctrines of judicial review as developed by Israeli courts-each of which is strikingly distinct from American law and practice. Those doctrines could not function well under a regime of closed review. Indeed, rather than being a routine matter of judicial procedure, the question of open or closed review goes to the heart of any judicial review system.
Standing
In the past, Israeli law adhered to a narrow concept of standing (somewhat similar to the "injury in fact" approach currently used by U.S. courts). 124 Under this doctrine, the petitioner had to establish a personal interest in the state action that was direct and substantial. 125 This approach began to change during the 1970s, 126 and was [Vol. 64 completely abandoned during the 1980s when the HCJ developed an expansive doctrine of "public petitioner." 127 This doctrine enables almost anyone to bring petitions to court against almost any administrative or executive action. Among other things, it enables citizens to challenge decisions relating to the appointment of senior executive officials, budgetary appropriations, and the provision of benefits, licenses, and any other governmental goods to parties other than the petitioners themselves. 128 This expansive concept of standing is inconsistent with a strict concept of closed review. Most of these "third party" petitioners were not parties to the administrative decisions they subsequently challenge in court. In these kinds of proceedings (which are commonplace in Israeli public law), there is no "original" stage at the agency level designed to deal with the petitioners' evidence and arguments (save, perhaps, the pre-litigation letter or documentation they are required to send the relevant decisionmaker before going to court). 129 Hence, the first time that the "record" for the litigation is shaped is at the judicial review stage. 130 
Jurisdiction
A second important doctrine refers to the jurisdiction of the HCJ. Under the Basic Law: The Judiciary, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court sitting as the HCJ is broadly defined. The Basic Law authorizes the HCJ to "hear matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal." 131 The HCJ defined this provision as enabling it to "seize" jurisdiction from any court or tribunal when the HCJ deems its direct and immediate involvement to be necessary. As a result, the HCJ may decide to deal with an undecided case under the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal. 132 
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This extraordinary capacity of the HCJ is used rarely and has no obvious U.S. counterpart. However, its existence suggests profound implications with respect to the whole system of judicial review, 133 including issues relating to the record. In order to seize control over a case under the jurisdiction of a lower court or a tribunal, the HCJ must be able to "construct" the record for its own purposes. If one adds to this exceptional rule of jurisdiction the considerable flexibility and informality of the procedure at the HCJ (and the administrative courts in general), 134 it seems that a strict, formalistic rule of closed review is foreign to the culture of administrative litigation in Israel. 
Reasonableness
Since the early 1980s, the HCJ has developed an expansive doctrine of reasonableness, which serves as the principal pillar of judicial review and a major vehicle to advance its activist ideology. Under this concept, the reviewing court is called upon to examine the administrative decision at stake and make sure that its result is not "extremely unreasonable."
136 Accordingly, it calls for an independent judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of the decision and depends on a particular judge's assessment of the meaning of this standard. 137 As examples of particularly intrusive exercises of judicial assessment of reasonableness, the HCJ ordered the Prime Minister to fire cabinet members 138 and ordered the government to rethink its policies [Vol. 64 on major national security matters. 139 Logically speaking, this activist concept of reasonableness does not require open review. Review could proceed on the basis of the record, reasons, and arguments as developed at the agency level or in lower courts. From an ideological point of view, however, the broad and independent assessment of the merits connoted by judicial activism seems inconsistent with a strict, formalistic approach that would make the court dependent on the agency's record. For example, when the HCJ ordered the government to change the location of the security barrier between Israel and the West Bank, the principal determination of the facts (regarding the security implication of each alternative location for the Barrier) was made by the Court itself, and not by the government. 
Selective Enforcement
Another doctrine of judicial review that seems inconsistent with closed review is selective enforcement. Since the early 1990s, the Israeli courts have developed an expansive doctrine of selective enforcement, for which there is no counterpart in the United States. 141 According to this doctrine, in Israel a person can challenge a decision to enforce the law against her (or to refrain from granting her a state benefit) without needing to demonstrate the existence of a legal duty owed to her. Instead, it is sufficient to demonstrate that an exemption from the law or a benefit was given to others, even if contrary to official policy. 142 Once again, the doctrine of selective enforcement, which focuses on what the agency did in cases other than the one at stake, seems incompatible with the concept of closed review.
III. exPLanatIons for the dIfference between
IsraeLI and u.s. PractIce
The most likely explanation for the divergence between the United States and Israel with respect to closed and open judicial review lies in some fundamental differences between the two systems of administrative adjudication (in addition to the striking differences between the two systems discussed in Part II.D above). The administrative adjudication systems of different countries vary tremendously, 2016] but almost always include three phases-initial decision, administrative reconsideration, and judicial review. All countries want their administrative adjudication systems to operate efficiently and to generate accurate results through a process that is acceptable to the private parties enmeshed in disputes with government. However, each country tends to place its primary reliance on (and invest most of its resources in) only one of the three phases; the other two are less important. 143 The U.S. system relies primarily on the initial decision to get things right. 144 As discussed earlier, 145 the initial agency decision normally consists of a trial-type adversarial proceeding. Adversarial initial decision proceedings are quite time consuming and costly for both the state (which has to pay its attorneys and the neutral arbiter) and private parties (who usually have to pay lawyers to represent them in the lengthy trial-type proceeding). Later phases in the process (administrative reconsideration and judicial review) are less significant than the initial decision and seldom overturn the factfindings or the exercise of discretion that occurred as part of the initial decision.
The closed review rules in the United States flow logically from the decision to invest most resources in the initial decision. That decision generates a written record of all of the testimony and other evidence offered at the hearing; the parties were in control of the proceedings and had the ability to introduce all relevant evidence and make all relevant arguments. The decisionmaker can consider only that evidence and those arguments. The initial decision creates a crystallized set of fact-findings and reasons that a reviewing court should respect by precluding the introduction of new evidence, arguments, or reasons at the review stage.
Similarly, in the United States, the rulemaking process is highly structured. 146 There must be notice to the general public and broad opportunity for public comment. The agency must disclose its methodology and critical data, and it must respond to public comments by explaining why it did not follow the suggestions or alternative solutions contained in those comments. This process is very costly. As in the case of adjudication, the U.S. system of rulemaking places primary responsibility for finding legislative facts and stating reasons at the level of the rulemaking agency. Reviewing courts should respect that process through a system of closed record, closed reasons, and closed argument. [Vol. 64
Israel follows a quite different model of adjudicatory decision making. It places primary reliance on the judicial review phase of administrative adjudication, rather than the initial decision or agency reconsideration phases. The broad rules relating to standing, jurisdiction, reasonableness, and selective enforcement discussed in the previous section evidence Israel's commitment to judicial review and its willingness to rely on courts to produce a just and accurate decision. Similarly, Israel's striking and unusual rule designating the Supreme Court in its role as the HCJ as the first and only court of jurisdiction at the judicial review stage in more significant cases reflects its commitment to judicial review as the most important level of administrative decision making.
At the initial decision phase, Israel follows the rules of natural justice, but the proceeding is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. The initial decision is considered to be a part of the agency's investigation and the private party has the opportunity to correct what it considers mistaken findings or an abuse of discretion by the investigators. 148 Under natural justice principles, the private party has a chance to make its arguments orally or in writing before an unbiased decisionmaker. However, that decisionmaker is often involved as an investigator in the case and can rely on his or her prior knowledge in finding the facts and exercising discretion. 149 There is usually no opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 150 This inquisitorial proceeding is sharply different from the U.S. commitment to trial-type adversarial proceedings at the initial decision level with an exclusive record and an uninvolved decisionmaker.
As a result, in Israeli practice, the record is not crystallized at the initial decision level. There may be no written record at all of the testimony offered at the initial decision level, and the decisionmaker may rely on non-record evidence. In light of these procedures, it is not surprising that the courts permit parties to the initial decision (as well as non-parties who become involved at the judicial review stage) to supplement the record by introducing affidavits from additional witnesses or experts, allow either party to advance new arguments, and permit the agency to state new reasons to support its decision.
It might seem that in cases involving an appeal from an agency to a tribunal, the record for judicial review would have crystallized at the tribunal phase in a way that would constrict the openness of the review at the judicial review stage. In reality, however, the current status of tribunals in the Israeli system is not firm enough to substantiate the development of an exception to the judicial acceptance of open review principles. 151 
2016]
Similarly, Israel provides no structured process for making quasilegislative policy decisions such as rules. 152 The agency no doubt consults with interested parties in the process of formulating the rules or other policies, but it is not required to inform the general public, solicit comments, conduct hearings, disclose its methodology, or respond to public comments if there are any. Judicial review offers the first structured opportunity for adversely affected parties to challenge the legality and reasonableness of quasi-legislative policy judgments. Consequently, it is unsurprising that courts are willing to entertain new evidence and arguments as well as new agency reasons at the judicial review stage. In the United States, the policy of closed record means that the evidentiary record is set during the initial decision process in both adjudication and rulemaking as well as in policy-implementation decisions. In addition, the policies of closed reasons and arguments force private parties to make all their arguments and agencies to state all their reasons at that initial decision stage. In Israel, on the other hand, administrative procedures for making quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative determinations at the agency level are much less structured than in the United States, and the tribunal system of administrative appeals is undeveloped. The most crucial stage of decision making in Israel is the judicial review process, and the preference for open review reflects this.
Our analysis also demonstrates that the question of open or closed review is intertwined with various other doctrines of review on both the procedural level (such as standing) and the substantive level (including the standards of review such as reasonableness and the prohibition on selective enforcement). Accordingly, one cannot consider revisions to the policy regarding the administrative record, nor those relating to new arguments or reasons, without bringing into consideration the implications of such a move on many other doctrines of judicial review.
